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Shakespeare and Posthumanist Theory

By Karen Raber
London: Bloomsbury, 2018
Reviewer: Jean E. Feerick

"The human is already inhuman" (145). quips Karen Raber,
echoing the rhythms of Bruno Latour's famous title that delivered
actor network theory to the world amid a call to rethink the
division of culture and nature as instead an assemblage. 1 In her
new book for the Arden Shakespeare and Theory series, Raber
takes up the dynamic and expansive field of posthumanism and
lhe cluster of theories that subtend its philosophical position and
demonslrales their relevance for and intersections with
Renaissance culture, as embodied not only by Shakespeare but
by a range of arl practitioners, philosophers, rhetoricians, and
scientists. Flouting the unity that poslhumanist theorists tend
lo assign Renaissance humanism, which Raber sardonically
mocks as a view of the era as a "premodern bondage machine"
(4), she builds her claims oul from an assertion she shares with
a recent volume edited by Scoll Maisano and Joseph Campana
lhal Renaissance humanism was a set of practices that yielded
less a stable notion of the human, than a compellingly self-divided
way of reading that makes it a compelling contributor to
poslhumanisl praclice. 2
Of course, this can be confusing if we construe the" post" in
posthumanism as denoting temporal sequence-seeming lo call
up the paradox of turning the "preface" of early modernity inlo
the "prologue" to our now. But Raber urges us to bracket linear
models of

thinking-which are themselves symptoms of the "exceptionalist"
paradigm posthumanism assaults-and associate the prefix instead
with an inclination Lo scatter the category of the human, construing
it as an ontology that is ongoing, mediated, extended, unstable, and
always in progress as it seeks lo define itself in opposition Lo a mov
ing assemblage of "others." In exposing and exploring the breadth
of human embeddedness in and attachment to various objects,
environments, and creatures in the work of Shakespeare and oth
ers, Raber reads Renaissance materials as providing important
access to a moment that was open to the paradoxes of human iden
tity, one not yet seeking cover in Cartesian dualism and the myth
of a transcendent reasoning faculty it helped to fuel. As she argues,
"Renaissance humanism did not (always) seek to extract humanity
from the mesh of beings in the world" (21). Rather, in her account,
it understood and at times even celebrated an awareness that the
human has never been fully human, although it is also true that
Enlightenment humanism has sometimes obscured our access to
this point.
Raber's book is lively, informative, theoretical, and expressive of
sharp close readings. I see it as a treasure trove for critics and stu
dents alike. One of the things I found particularly exciting about
her account of posthumanism is how she treats this capacious the
ory as a kind of switchboard that opens pathways to and from a
range of philosophical and political projects, including eco
criticism, new materialism, animal studies, phenomenology,
extended and distributed cognition, embodied identity, disability
theory, and cyborg studies, among others. Raber has distilled the
wisdom of an impressive range of theorists-from Hayles and
Braidolli to Derrida, Delueze, Haraway, Bennett, and Latour
presenting each in digestible chunks for her readers, while also
placing them in relation to one another. This is one of her particu
lar skills-identifying and clarifying Lhe salient points of complex
theoretical arguments and then putting them in dialogue with one
another. Toward this end, she animates Haraway's critique of
Deleuze and her embrace of Latour. And she narrates Derrida and
Agamben as they respond to Descartes. She is on very sound foot
ing philosophically, although she occasionally apologizes for con
densing whole traditions into a few paragraphs. Since that is
precisely what the volume calls for, she meets the challenge with
aplomb. She also tracks the development and significance of whole
fields in Renaissance studies such as humoralism, phenomenology

and animal studies, showing how they contribute lo and echo the
foundational claims of poslhurnanism. Reading her book as I was
designing a graduate course on Ecocriticism and Renaissance Liter
ature, I came to see it as a terrific resource for students who might
need a crisp account of Latour, Bogosl, or Agamben lo allow them
lo join the critical conversation.
Her chapters, too, had a design that emblematized the feel of net
works and assemblages in action, as opposed to taut, linear argu
ments set up to overturn earlier readings or critical models. Raber
has opted lo creatively cluster her chapters around a theoretical
approach, such as animal studies or cyborg theory; a defining trope,
such as the face as interchange between body and mind or the cen
taur as emblem of the human/animal dyad; and a set of texts,
including Shakespeare's plays but also a range of other cultural
artifacts. Al limes, she dives deeply into readings of the plays, as
she does in her first chapter in grappling with King Lear's "queer
cosmos," a phrase she borrows from Laurie Shannon. 3 Elsewhere,
her method shifts, as when she turns to well-charted areas such as
animal studies or theories of embodiment, which have been deeply
mined by recent criticism and have yielded multiple rich, capa
cious studies in article and monograph form. In chapter 3, for
instance, she spends less time in providing a new reading of a play
than in threading connections between the work of posthumanist
theorists like N. Katherine Hayles and Stacy Alaimo and that of
early modernists like Gail Paster, Bruce Smith, and Holly Dugan
in areas like humoral embodiment, phenomenology, or disability
theory. As she demonstrates in accounting for scholarship that
spans roughly two decades, early modern critics have been un
covering in Renaissance texts a conception of the human that is
dispersed, extended, and embedded, one that bears uncanny re
semblance to posthumanism and supports her thesis that returning
to this era can creatively inflect and enrichen the posthumanist
project, as well as revitalize study of Shakespeare by posing new
questions and making us alert lo new archives and angles.
In the second half of the book, she explores the animal and
cyborg dimensions of human identity for Renaissance writ
ers. Chapter 4 charts the ubiquity and conceptual centrality of
animals-or creaturely life-in Shakespeare's plays, concluding
with a discussion of Tilus Andronicus. Notable in this chapter is
her discussion of the name that Shakespeare's character Chiron
shares with the eldest centaur of Greek mythology, etymologically

linked lo the word for "hand," which identifies and explains the
figure's longstanding association with skill in the use of tools,
instruments, and other objects lo denote his human-like mastery
over nature. Compellingly, Shakespeare's character inverts all such
associations when he unleashes bestial violence on Rome, begin
ning with his ravagement of Lavinia, thereby dismantling the cate
gory of the human and exposing violence as the foundation upon
which civilization rests. Raber's last full chapter lacks toward the
inhuman, exploring imaginative engagements with the shaping
powers of technology in a Renaissance era defined by a "seismic
shift in the speed and nature of knowledge transmission" (130).
Discussions of Giovanni Bracelli's and Albrecht Dtirer's geometric
renderings of the human body as an assemblage of object-like
parts-a kind of robot-dovetails into a discussion of the cyborgian
armored warrior of Shakespeare's history plays, which stage a
relentless twinning of men and metal on the battlefield. In donning
armor, wielding weapons, and commanding men, Shakespeare's
warriors operate as "extended, fortified beings ...made up of other
human and non-human stuff" (152-53). They morph, that is, into
iron men.
And yet, it was in the sustained close reading that comprises her
first chapter on Lear that I found Raber to be at her best in enacting
the value that posthumanist theories and reading practices have for
canonical plays. Itself a play that has been at the center of impor
tant articles from the perspective of animal studies (Shannon) and
eco-critical approaches (Egan and Mentz). Lear here is yet made lo
articulate a new kind of posthumanist perspective, as Raber weighs
the shifting representations of the natural world that express the
characters' disparate moral and political sensibilities, from the self
interested cunning of an Edmund to the ethical certainty of an
Edgar or Kent. Positioning herself against theories of orderly and
hierarchical life made famous by Tillyard and aligning her reading
instead with theories of tumult and disharmony implicitly ad
vanced long ago by Arthur Lovejoy and, more recently, by Steve
Mentz, Raber argues that the play stages the strategies of control
that humans use lo counter the overwhelming experience of being
confronted by "hyperobjects," the term Timothy Morton has
assigned to material forces so large and powerful that they con
found human conceptualization.4 In the case of Lear, the dance
between assertions of an ordered and providential universe and the
abiding sense of nature as an unwieldy, entropic force that haunts

the play serves as a tacit acknowledgment by the dramatist that
powerful cosmic activities leave us bewildered, grasping al organ
izing patterns to hold chaos at bay. For Raber, the play reduces its
characters to the "humility of unknowing" (52), a posture that she
sees as powerfully emblematized by the stumbling, foolish figure of
Gloucester, who smells and feels his way to Dover, a mere grovel
ing creature unable lo distinguish life from death. Notably, Raber
returns to the figure of Gloucester in her brief final chapter, identi
fying the unknowing man-animal as a fitting emblem of posl
humanism, one who disperses the comforting fictions of "life, love,
and family" (161) that gather around the "plays' charismatic mega
fauna like Cordelia, Edgar, Kent, or Lear himself" (161).
In threading the theory of hyperobjects into this play, Raber ech
oes a question once raised by A. C. Bradley who asked, in effect,
why must Gloucester head all the way lo Dover to die? Raber fol
lows this lead in speculating that part of Dover's appeal lies in its
recent devastation at the hands of a massive earthquake in 1580
that tumbled houses and spawned tsunamis, seeming to strike al
the very symbols of human civilization. Shakespeare's characters
evoke this place repeatedly in the play, Raber proposes, as a sort of
return lo and evocation of a moment of collective trauma. I confess,
I was intrigued by these details, not knowing of these associations
or events. But I also found the shift to topicality as a guiding heuris
tic at a key moment in the chapter to sit in uneasy relation with
Raber's dexterous use of more agile theoretical models elsewhere.
Topicality has, it should be said, become a preferred analytical
mode for some, if not all eco-critics, who seem lo gravitate toward
and privilege empirical facts-pollution, deforestation, fossil
fuels-to bridge early modernity to the "now" of ecological dev
astation. But Raber understands that even as eco-criticism and
poslhumanism overlap, they are not contiguous and may even
occasionally be in tension. I see such a tension in her turn lo the
topical as a kind of key that grants privileged access lo the text, pre
cisely because it seems to underscore a way of thinking that privi
leges "turning points or historical pivots" (159) and thereby betrays
a bid for epistemological mastery that is at odds with posthuman
ism. I applaud instead the skeptical posture Raber elsewhere
applies to "stabilizing" readings that concede a privileged view lo
the modern critic, preferring lo guard against totalizing critical
moves in order lo underscore the presence of a range of actants his
torically, whether ontologically or epistemologically. Her final brief

chapter, in facl, is an eloquent call for such a praclice, which she
describes as a "slow, disabled, bul environmentally aware posthu
manism," which "arises out of millions of cellular pulses across the
strands of culture, Lhe academy and individuals over a longer tem
poral arc" (160-61). It is a poslhumanism not limiled lo Shake
speareans, nor lo practitioners of Lhe humanilies, nor even to
humankind. She may be appealing lo a scholarly version of the Par
liament of Things famously evoked by Latour as a working model
for a more equilable political practice in which the voice and inter
esls of all aclanls-human and nonhuman-affected by a given pol
icy gain representation in the polilical process. Raber's book
helpfully poinls us in a similar direction for our scholarly practice,
urging us to be on the lookout for lhose moments when "human
subjectivity is king and lhe earth [or lhe past] merely an objecl to
know" (49). She concludes by puzzling over the potentially crip
pling paradox for lhe kind of posthumanism she advocales, which
is a deeply ethical and political practice as well as a theoretical
model. If there is no human subject to stand as lhe "origin of
decision-making" and the engine of ethical practice, how do post
humanists purporl "lo transform and improve human beings-if
not the beings themselves, then their effects on their fellow crea
tures and on the places we have to live" (25), the goal that inspires
much of this work? In response, Raber fittingly provides another
question: "Might we need both a strategic subjectivity and a strate
gic exceptionalism lo put ethics into praclice as politics or law?"
(162). Open-ended, qualified, dialogical, and performative-lhis
and the other questions with which she concludes her study invite
us lo add our voices and our studies to the network of "millions of
cellular pulses" (160) which she identifies with the slow work of
undoing human exceplionalism.
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